Economia

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Navegando Economia por Assunto "Adverse selection"

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    A economia da informação : rumo a um programa de pesquisa alternativo
    (Universidade Federal do Espírito Santo, 2012-05-30) Xavier, Luís Eugênio de Menezes; Herscovici, Alain Pierre Claude Henri; Grassi, Robson Antonio; Pessali, Huáscar Fialho
    This work aims to discuss the emergence of a research program in Economic Science, concerning the analysis of information asymmetries, the differences and epistemological implications of Pareto optimal equilibrium, in contrast to the standard neoclassical approach. In pursuit of this goal, it was necessary to highlight the method of both paradigms, yet it was also necessary to discuss the philosophy/epistemology of science involved and which serve as the basis for an approach related to paradigm shifts in science. In chapter 1 we discussed the epistemology of science, from three authors: Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos. We defined the set of hypotheses that can be associated with the method employed by the neoclassical school, from the philosophy of science proposed by Lakatos. Then, in chapter 2, we did a long exposure of the neoclassical method, setting axioms inherent in well-behaved preferences, presenting algebraically the Walrasian general equilibrium, illustrating relaxation of auxiliary hypotheses of the neoclassical model from Friedman and, finally, applying the neoclassical instrumental to the relaxation of auxiliary hypotheses of completeness of information from the model developed by Grossman & Stiglitz (1976) and developed by mathematical expansion of this work. Finally, we close this dissertation with chapter 3, which basically lays out the major contributions of authors such as Stiglitz, Akerlof and Arrow, with respect to markets permeated by asymmetric information and opportunistic behavior. We show the consequences for the market itself, reaching results in which it was extinguished. Here is the second part of the model of Grossman & Stiglitz, emphasizing the imperfect nature of the price system, their inability to convey all the information about the goods to all agents, and, finally, we discussed various topics related to the Economics of Information.