Filosofia
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Navegando Filosofia por Autor "Araujo, Arthur Octavio de Melo"
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- ItemA CONSCIÊNCIA INTENCIONAL COMO SUBJETIVIDADE CONCRETA: ESTUDO SOBRE O IRREFLETIDO E O REFLEXIVO NA FILOSOFIA DE JEAN-PAUL SARTRE(Universidade Federal do Espírito Santo, 2020-09-21) Modolo, Damares Franca; Souza, Thana Mara de; https://orcid.org/0000000284613239; http://lattes.cnpq.br/1586702620708183; https://orcid.org/; http://lattes.cnpq.br/; Araujo, Arthur Octavio de Melo; https://orcid.org/; http://lattes.cnpq.br/7986103638057702; Erculino, Siloe Cristina do Nascimento; https://orcid.org/; http://lattes.cnpq.br/La subjectivité dans la pensée de Jean-Paul Sartre est conçue comme mouvement intentionnel, qui, parmi tant de modes de don, perçoit, imagine, s'émeut et signifie le monde. Ce n est pas un système d intériorisation des impressions, des jugements et des co
- ItemA crítica contemporânea ao dualismo metafísico alma-corpo de René Descartes(Universidade Federal do Espírito Santo, 2010-12-02) Borges, David Gonçalves; Araujo, Arthur Octavio de Melo; Candiotto, Kleber Bez Birolo; Murta, Claudia Pereira do CarmoThis dissertation aimed to research about the contemporary conceptions concerning the mind, using as philosophical reference René Descartes - the thinker who inaugurates the inquiries on the subject with his works "Meditations On First Philosophy" and "Treatise on the Passions of the Soul." The investigation sought to identify the main implications of Cartesian metaphysics on the philosophy of mind, and to show that the latter only became a field of study distinct from other philosophical fields since it started from criticism of the Cartesianism. In the first section an extensive presentation of the thought of René Descartes was prepared, with special emphasis on his views about the "soul" (or "mind" in contemporary terms). The second section addressed the first criticisms on dualism, as well as the objections contained in the works of Gilbert Ryle and Daniel Dennett. The third section presents non-dualistic and noneliminativistic approaches, focusing on the positions of John Searle and Antonio Damasio. It was concluded that the philosophy of mind followed a linear, gradual, and somehow inevitable development - in the latter case, keeping in mind mainly how it originated from the categories postulated initially by Descartes. Additionally, it was concluded that the path to greater success and wider potential for the advancement of cognitive science is in the union between empirical and philosophical knowledge, similar to the methodology employed by Damasio.
- ItemA teoria de mundo-próprio de Jakob Von Uexkull : entre a metafísica e o naturalismo(Universidade Federal do Espírito Santo, 2012-12-14) Souza, Elaine Cristina Borges de; Araujo, Arthur Octavio de Melo; Di Clemente, Fabio; Ternes, JoséThis work proposes to analyze the philosophical meanig of the theory of "self-world" (in German, Umwelt) devoloped by the biologist Jakob Von Uexkull. Among different interpretations proposed by important philophers, the theory is situted between an eventual metaphysics and a particular form of naturalism regarding to the way how different lived organisms perceive and act on the environment. To make possible this study, this work is divided in tree chapters. The fist on is dedicated to an analysis on the wide influence that Uexkull had from Kant s ideas and that indicates the philosophical basis of his theoretical biology. In the second chapter, we will analyze Heidegger interpretation that understands the theory of self-world in a particular metalphisical meaning. In the third chapter, we will examine the interpratation that understands the theory of sel-world as an altenative form of naturalism which breaks away the cartesian dualism in Merleau-Ponty view. From this showing, it is proposed to evaluate the eventual interpretations for the theory of self-world and their philosophical consequences.
- ItemAnotações sobre a filosofia da psicologia em Ludwig Wittgenstein(Universidade Federal do Espírito Santo, 2013-05-24) Silva, Filicio Mulinari e; Araujo, Arthur Octavio de Melo; Di Clemente, Fabio; Valle, BortoloGrounded on the writings on the philosophy of psychology written by Wittgenstein at the end of the 40s, the central goal of this research will be the analysis of how Wittgenstein understands the significance of psychological concepts as well as their relationships with other problems related to them. In the first part of the research, it will be preliminary weighted the concepts on which the philosopher relies to conduct his consideration of the philosophy of psychology. The attention given to these concepts is justified according as, without them, the understanding of how Wittgenstein treats these issues in his writings on the philosophy of psychology would be jeopardized. Once highlighted the notions surrounding the writings on the philosophy of psychology, then it will be evaluated the criticism made by Wittgenstein to the traditional notion of meaning by introspection. Once realized the research on introspection as a way of meaning for psychological terms, then this opens up scope for understanding Wittgensteins critique of introspection model of meaning and then to study the solution given by the philosopher to the problem of the meaning of mental terms. In the second part of this work, it will be analyzed how Wittgenstein proposes connecting the psychological terms with the perception. This will present the criticism of Wittgensteins conception of the mind as private background that proposes that only the individual who feels a certain sense has access to the supposed private object in which the concept of sensation would be referenced. Once punctuated Wittgensteins criticism on mind as private mental scene, then it breaks into another problem connected intimately with two distinct psychological concepts, i.e., the question of noting an aspect (seeing a aspect), which has its foundation on a grammatical confusion regarding the concepts of seeing [sehen] and interpreting. This problem makes possible to understand how certain problems related to mental are actually grammatical confusions arising from the misuse of psychological terms, especially when they are commanding for a one-sided understanding of language. Briefly, after having seen some of the main points related to Wittgensteins writings on the philosophy of psychology, they will be made final considerations that take into account how the philosopher sees the relationship between mind and language with respect to psychological concepts. It will be highlighted the central appointments made in the research and, after that, it will be analyzed how such considerations can be used to evaluate a new treatment for traditional philosophical problems, namely a treatment given by the analysis of language.
- ItemSobre o estatuto discursivo do Tractatus Logico Philosophicus de Wittgenstein: aspecto autoexplicativo(Universidade Federal do Espírito Santo, 2023-08-25) Cerqueira, Erivaldo Soares; Araujo, Arthur Octavio de Melo; http://lattes.cnpq.br/7986103638057702; https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1035-5468; http://lattes.cnpq.br/5480323142545695; Porto, Andre da Silva; Junior, Leo PeruzzoThis dissertation deals with Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and emphasizes the problem of final self-refutation manifested in aphorism 6.54. In this aphorism, Wittgenstein stresses that anyone who understands it must recognize the Tractatian propositions as absurd and abandon them in the end. The consequent self-refutation of the work proves to be part of the process of elucidating the propositions of the Tractatus. This dissertation, therefore, aims to clarify the dynamics involved in this enlightening process and, therefore, justify in what sense a work, supposedly composed of nonsense, can be enlightening. Therefore, in the first chapter, a re-reading of the work Tractatus is carried out in order to understand its main concepts and discuss the apparently incongruous aspect of its discourse. In the second chapter, taking into account the theme of self-refutation, the debate between two interpretative currents of the Tractatus is analyzed: the Standard Reading and the Revisionist Reading. Following the proposal of this dissertation, the emphasis will be on the ineffable reading of Peter Hacker and the resolute readings of Cora Diamond and James Conant. According to inefabilists, although the propositions of the Tractatus are absurd, they convey certain ineffable insights into the nature of reality, thought, and the world. To justify this interpretation, the ineffabilists resort to the distinction between “saying” and “showing”. On the other hand, resolute interpreters believe that in the Tractatus nothing is said or shown; they are simply nonsense that must be abandoned, as suggested by Wittgenstein himself. The resolute see the Tractatus as a kind of therapy whose aim is to cure the reader of the illusions arising from the misuse of language. Based on this debate, in the last chapter, from a third line of interpretation, alternative to the ineffable and resolute readings, a certain peculiarity of the Tractatian discourse will be emphasized, which demonstrates to reveal a “self-explanatory aspect” to the Tractatus. Understanding this aspect can contribute to understanding the elucidative dynamics of the Tractatus and, thus, recognizing that the supposed paradox of final self-refutation is only apparent.