Anotações sobre a filosofia da psicologia em Ludwig Wittgenstein
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Data
2013-05-24
Autores
Silva, Filicio Mulinari e
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Universidade Federal do Espírito Santo
Resumo
Grounded on the writings on the philosophy of psychology written by Wittgenstein at the end of the 40s, the central goal of this research will be the analysis of how Wittgenstein understands the significance of psychological concepts as well as their relationships with other problems related to them. In the first part of the research, it will be preliminary weighted the concepts on which the philosopher relies to conduct his consideration of the philosophy of psychology. The attention given to these concepts is justified according as, without them, the understanding of how Wittgenstein treats these issues in his writings on the philosophy of psychology would be jeopardized. Once highlighted the notions surrounding the writings on the philosophy of psychology, then it will be evaluated the criticism made by Wittgenstein to the traditional notion of meaning by introspection. Once realized the research on introspection as a way of meaning for psychological terms, then this opens up scope for understanding Wittgensteins critique of introspection model of meaning and then to study the solution given by the philosopher to the problem of the meaning of mental terms. In the second part of this work, it will be analyzed how Wittgenstein proposes connecting the psychological terms with the perception. This will present the criticism of Wittgensteins conception of the mind as private background that proposes that only the individual who feels a certain sense has access to the supposed private object in which the concept of sensation would be referenced. Once punctuated Wittgensteins criticism on mind as private mental scene, then it breaks into another problem connected intimately with two distinct psychological concepts, i.e., the question of noting an aspect (seeing a aspect), which has its foundation on a grammatical confusion regarding the concepts of seeing [sehen] and interpreting. This problem makes possible to understand how certain problems related to mental are actually grammatical confusions arising from the misuse of psychological terms, especially when they are commanding for a one-sided understanding of language. Briefly, after having seen some of the main points related to Wittgensteins writings on the philosophy of psychology, they will be made final considerations that take into account how the philosopher sees the relationship between mind and language with respect to psychological concepts. It will be highlighted the central appointments made in the research and, after that, it will be analyzed how such considerations can be used to evaluate a new treatment for traditional philosophical problems, namely a treatment given by the analysis of language.
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Palavras-chave
Language , Mind , Mente , Psychological verbs , Verbos , Introspection , Psicológicos , Expression , Introspecção , Sensations , Sensações
Citação
SILVA, Filicio Mulinari e. Anotações sobre a filosofia da psicologia em Ludwig Wittgenstein. 2013. 109 f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Filosofia) - Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia, Universidade Federal do Espírito Santo, Vitória, 2013.