Mestrado em Filosofia
URI Permanente para esta coleção
Nível: Mestrado Acadêmico
Ano de início: 2008
Conceito atual na CAPES: 4
Ato normativo: Homologado pelo CNE (Portaria MEC Nº 609, de 14/03/2019). Publicação no DOU 18 de março de 2019, seç. 1 - Parecer CNE/CES nº 487/2018, Processo no 23001.000335/2018-51). Publicado no DOU 28/07/2005, seção 1, página 11)
Periodicidade de seleção: Semestral
Área(s) de concentração: Filosofia
Url do curso: https://filosofia.ufes.br/pt-br/pos-graduacao/PPGFil/detalhes-do-curso?id=47
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- ItemA relação entre tempo e narrativa no pensamento de Paul Ricoeur: a leitura do Livro XI das Confissões de Agostinho(Universidade Federal do Espírito Santo, 2024-01-01) Marques, Juliana das Neves Correa; Santos, Jorge Augusto da Silva; https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6111-1693; http://lattes.cnpq.br/3088783002373165; https://orcid.org/0009-0009-4549-2508; http://lattes.cnpq.br/1079832775812437; Barreira, Marcelo Martins; https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9367-3073; http://lattes.cnpq.br/0690909917220112; Rossatto, Noeli Dutra; https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4176-574X; http://lattes.cnpq.br/2947312243186882This paper investigates Paul Ricoeur’s reading of Book XI of Augustine’s Confessions, as developed in Temps et Récit. The main objective is to identify elements in Augustine’s work that support Ricoeur’s thesis that time becomes human as it is narratively structured. To guide our research, we have formulated some central and general questions that we seek to answer throughout this investigation, namely: In what way does Augustine attempt to solve the enigma of time? What elements does Ricoeur find in Book XI that support his thesis that the solution to the paradoxes of time is narrative? Does Ricoeur ignore the relationship between time and eternity in his interpretation of Book XI of Confessions? To answer these questions, it is necessary to reconstruct Augustine’s meditation contained in Book XI of Confessions, in light of Ricoeur’s reading as presented in Temps et Récit. Augustine suggests a subjective conception of time, experienced internally in the soul as distentio animi (the distension of the mind). To reach this conclusion, Augustine reflects on the relationship between time and eternity, the ontological paradoxes of being and non-being of time, and the measurement of time. He contrasts the skeptical argument, which denies the existence of time, with everyday language, which inexplicably suggeststhat time doesindeed exist. Itseems that, in examining Augustine’s meditation on time, Ricoeur perceives that the Christian philosopher, in attempting to explain time, necessarily resorts to narrative, although without realizing it. Thus, Ricoeur argues that time only becomes human when it is narrated. For him, time acquires meaning and dimension through narrative, becoming incomprehensible otherwise: time exists because we narrate it.
- ItemUm esboço do ceticismo metafilosófico contemporâneo(Universidade Federal do Espírito Santo, 2025-02-27) Gonçalves, Conrado Vasconcelos; Salatiel, José Renato; https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5858-1248; Dinucci, Aldo Lopes; Carijó, Filipe HerkenhoffThe present research investigates the thesis of metaphilosophical skepticism as it has been presented and discussed recently, along with the arguments in its favor, the reactions to he implications of such form of skepticism to the practice of philosophy, traditionally conceived of as the search for ideal epistemic states, and the prospects of living while identifying as a skeptic about philosophy. First, it analyzes the components of the traditional conception of philosophy as epistemic philosophy, as well as the concept and forms of skepticism, in order to determine in which sense the thesis of metaphilosophical skepticism is a form of skepticism about philosophy, concluding that it is the thesis according to which (i) philosophers do not possess a relevant ideal epistemic state about the philosophical theses they advance; (ii) philosophers should therefore suspend belief or reduce high confidence about these theses. Following this, it presents the arguments in favor of the metaphilosophical skeptical thesis that philosophers do not possess rational belief about the theses they advance and should therefore suspend belief or reduce high confidence about these theses, giving special focus to the epistemological arguments that appeal to the notion of epistemic defeaters. Following this, it presents the arguments for the implication that metaphilosophical skepticism leads not only to the irrationality of the practice of philosophy, but also to what has been called “the sincere philosopher’s dilemma”: either the philosopher must abandon the sincerity of his believing his own philosophical views in order to be rational, or he must abandon his rationality in order to sincerely advance the philosophical views he believes. Different responses to the dilemma are presented and assessed. After concluding that they are insufficient, it presents three problems to those who wish to identify themselves as metaphilosophical skeptics: the problem of self-refutation, the problem of the entanglement between the philosophical and the non-philosophical, and the problem of apraxia. It outlines in response to these problems a model of a consistent metaphilosophical skeptic inspired by the model of the skeptic proposed by some neopyrrhonians. Finally, it discusses the question whether the consistent metaphilosophical skeptic is at bottom a neopyrrhonian, and concludes that, on the contrary, pyrrhonism and neopyrrhonism are particular manifestations of metaphilosophical skepticism as an attitude.
- ItemO desamparo trágico: um diálogo entre Freud e Nietzsche(Universidade Federal do Espírito Santo, 2025-02-21) Ribeiro, Victor Oliveira; Paula, Wander Andrade de; https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7552-9844; Medrado, Alice Parrela; Vecchia, Ricardo Bazilio DallaHelplessness (Hilflosigkeit) in Freud's work has special relevance as a constitutive basis of the subject's psychic life, even though he has not dedicated to an independent work, nor a strict conceptualization. One can perceive, in the recurrent mentions of the founder of psychoanalysis, a dimension that could be understood as tragic helplessness, given its inexorability, whose tension is not capable of a solution, despite the desire of individuals to insistently try to overcome or deny it. In view of this, the aim of this research is to investigate helplessness in Freud's work based on the concept of the tragic in Nietzsche, so to discuss how the tragic can be a predicate for helplessness and, with this view, to highlight possible ways in which it is possible to deal with the subject's helpless condition. In order to develop the research, we intend to divide the work into four chapters: first, we discuss the way in which Freud relates to philosophy; in the second, we discuss the notion of helplessness in Freud in order to understand its developments in psychoanalysis, especially the social dimension; in the third chapter, we address the concept of tragedy in the young Nietzsche; in the fourth and last chapter, we discuss the possible tragic character of helplessness, as well as the possible implications of this possible conclusion.
- ItemUm esboço do ceticismo metafilosófico contemporâneo(Universidade Federal do Espírito Santo, 2025-02-27) Gonçalves, Conrado Vasconcelos; Salatiel, José Renato; https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5858-1248; http://lattes.cnpq.br/8005576464240791; https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6486-2115; http://lattes.cnpq.br/4926634129611891; Dinucci, Aldo Lopes; https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5854-4057; http://lattes.cnpq.br/7527207958979360; Carijó, Filipe Herkenhoff; https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7581-0388; http://lattes.cnpq.br/4926634129611891The present research investigates the thesis of metaphilosophical skepticism as it has been presented and discussed recently, along with the arguments in its favor, the reactions to the implications of such form of skepticism to the practice of philosophy, traditionally conceived of as the search for ideal epistemic states, and the prospects of living while identifying as a skeptic about philosophy. First, it analyzes the components of the traditional conception of philosophy as epistemic philosophy, as well as the concept and forms of skepticism, in order to determine in which sense the thesis of metaphilosophical skepticism is a form of skepticism about philosophy, concluding that it is the thesis according to which (i) philosophers do not possess a relevant ideal epistemic state about the philosophical theses they advance; (ii) philosophers should therefore suspend belief or reduce high confidence about these theses. Following this, it presents the arguments in favor of the metaphilosophical skeptical thesis that philosophers do not possess rational belief about the theses they advance and should therefore suspend belief or reduce high confidence about these theses, giving special focus to the epistemological arguments that appeal to the notion of epistemic defeaters. Following this, it presents the arguments for the implication that metaphilosophical skepticism leads not only to the irrationality of the practice of philosophy, but also to what has been called “the sincere philosopher’s dilemma”: either the philosopher must abandon the sincerity of his believing his own philosophical views in order to be rational, or he must abandon his rationality in order to sincerely advance the philosophical views he believes. Different responses to the dilemma are presented and assessed. After concluding that they are insufficient, it presents three problems to those who wish to identify themselves as metaphilosophical skeptics: the problem of self-refutation, the problem of the entanglement between the philosophical and the non-philosophical, and the problem of apraxia. It outlines in response to these problems a model of a consistent metaphilosophical skeptic inspired by the model of the skeptic proposed by some neopyrrhonians. Finally, it discusses the question whether the consistent metaphilosophical skeptic is at bottom a neopyrrhonian, and concludes that, on the contrary, pyrrhonism and neopyrrhonism are particular manifestations of metaphilosophical skepticism as an attitude
- ItemMapas incorporados no mundo de experiência: explorando a noção de mente incorporada no empirismo radical de William James(Universidade Federal do Espírito Santo, 2024-12-17) Calado, Aisllan de Paula; Araújo, Arthur Octávio de Melo; https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5585-057X; Salatiel, José Renato; Peruzzo Júnior, LeoThis dissertation explores the notion of embodied mind in William James’s radical empiricism, by attributing it to the objective nucleus of experience and subjective, or mental aspects, that emerge from this nucleus in its continuity with the world, in parallel with the contemporary notion of “embodied mind”. In his work Essays in radical empiricism, published in 1912, James gathers, systematically, the radicalization of the notion of experience. The author presents the term “pure experience” as a philosophical reorientation regarding empiricism problem about the origin of knowledge. This study presents three descriptions of pure experience, that represent the notion of experience developed by James in his radical empiricism. Subsequently, the term objective nucleus of experience is presented as an expression of embodied mind. Establishing the continuity between James’s late philosophy and his psychology, the topographical metaphor is explored as a model for the mind by the author, a model that considers mind as a dynamical aspect, and the possibility of building conceptual models. This study identifies the elements bridging radical empiricism and the notion of embodied mind, contained in James’s objective nucleus of experience and his topographical metaphor.