Doutorado em Filosofia

URI Permanente para esta coleção

http://repositorio.ufes.br/handle/10/17516

Nível: Doutorado
Ano de início: 2019
Conceito atual na CAPES: 4
Ato normativo: Ato normativo: Homologado pelo CNE (Portaria MEC Nº 609, de 14/03/2019). Publicação no DOU 18 de março de 2019, seç. 1 - Parecer CNE/CES nº 487/2018, Processo no 23001.000335/2018-51).
Periodicidade de seleção: Semestral
Área(s) de concentração: Filosofia
Url do curso: https://filosofia.ufes.br/pt-br/pos-graduacao/PPGFil/detalhes-do-curso?id=125

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    Do sentido ao problema da verdade na fenomenologia de Edmund Husserl : implicações da ressignificação transcendental do conceito de transcendência na adaequatio rei et intellectus husserliana
    (Universidade Federal do Espírito Santo, 2024-06-12) Rocha, João Marcelo Silva da; Santos, Jorge Augusto da Silva ; https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6111-1693; http://lattes.cnpq.br/3088783002373165; https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4590-3081; http://lattes.cnpq.br/3191983998922351; Wu, Roberto; https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6344-4571; http://lattes.cnpq.br/3569614178649757; Sena, Sandro Márcio Moura de ; https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2119-7741; http://lattes.cnpq.br/4020907438721922; Curvello, Flávio Vieira ; https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9072-4472; http://lattes.cnpq.br/3683549895365835; Tourinho, Carlos Diogenes Cortes ; https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5963-599X; http://lattes.cnpq.br/4439167668298111
    The present thesis develops reflections on the concepts of truth and transcendence as they manifest especially in the Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, with the general aim of analyzing the implications of the meaning of “transcendence” in the correspondence-based conception of truth prevalent in Husserlian thought. Structured in five chapters, the investigation begins by outlining the traditional sense of truth as correspondence in its structuring aspects and the emerging problematic in the configuration of the relationship between knowing subject and knowable object based on specific delimitations of the concept of transcendence. Thus, Husserl's concepts of “truth” and “evidence” advocated in the Logical Investigations are analyzed, delineating the four phenomenological senses of “truth” as exposed in §39 of the 6th Logical Investigation. Moreover, it is emphasized the primacy of the meaning of “true being” in determining the other senses of truth. The third chapter explores the senses of “transcendence” and “immanence”, examining the redefinition of these concepts promoted with the transition to Transcendental Phenomenology and how it reconfigures the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity, revealing the former as constitutive and the latter as constituted. This transformation suggests the loss of the autonomy of the transcendent in relation to subjectivity, a presupposition of correspondence-based truth. In the fourth chapter, a similar approach is taken to that in the second chapter, focusing, however, on Husserl's description of the senses of “truth” and “evidence” in works of the transcendental phase of Phenomenology. The aim of this analysis is to demonstrate that the formal characterization of such concepts remains in accordance with the parameters established in the Logical Investigations, contrary to what the transformations discussed in the third chapter might suggest, and that the primacy of the meaning of “truth” attributed to the object also persists in the transcendental version of Husserlian thought. Considering this, the problem regarding the implications of “transcendence” in Husserl's conception of truth is established in the fifth and final chapter: initially, it is explained how correspondence-based truth becomes problematic in the Logical Investigations precisely due to the meaning of “transcendent” adopted in this work. Finally, a justification is proposed for maintaining correspondence-based truth in Transcendental Phenomenology due to the implications of the specifically phenomenological transcendental concept of transcendence. This interpretative proposal is presented through the demarcation of a double constitutive layer concerning the objective pole of the intentional relation committed to the achievement of true knowledge. Based on the description of the constitutive processes carried out in each of these layers, it is ultimately argued that the autonomy of the transcendent in relation to the veritative relation – a requirement inscribed in the correspondence-based conception of truth – is ensured by the constitution of the transcendent as such, carried out in the foundational layer. Besides, the constitutive dependence of the transcendent as true in relation to subjectivity, imposed by transcendental reduction, is expressed in the synthesis of evident fulfillment carried out in the founded layer
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    Do sentido ao problema da verdade na fenomenologia de Edmund Husserl: implicações da ressignificação transcendental do conceito de transcendência na adaequatio rei et intellectus husserliana
    (Universidade Federal do Espírito Santo, 2024-06-12) Rocha, João Marcelo Silva da; Santos, Jorge Augusto da Silva; https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6111-1693; http://lattes.cnpq.br/; Orientador2; https://orcid.org/; http://lattes.cnpq.br/; https://orcid.org/; http://lattes.cnpq.br/; Wu, Roberto; https://orcid.org/; http://lattes.cnpq.br/; Sena, Sandro Márcio Moura de; https://orcid.org/; http://lattes.cnpq.br/; Curvello, Flávio Vieira; https://orcid.org/; http://lattes.cnpq.br/; Tourinho, Carlos Diógenes; http://lattes.cnpq.br/
    The present thesis develops reflections on the concepts of truth and transcendence as they manifest especially in the Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, with the general aim of analyzing the implications of the meaning of “transcendence” in the correspondence-based conception of truth prevalent in Husserlian thought. Structured in five chapters, the investigation begins by outlining the traditional sense of truth as correspondence in its structuring aspects and the emerging problematic in the configuration of the relationship between knowing subject and knowable object based on specific delimitations of the concept of transcendence. Thus, Husserl's concepts of “truth” and “evidence” advocated in the Logical Investigations are analyzed, delineating the four phenomenological senses of “truth” as exposed in §39 of the 6th Logical Investigation. Moreover, it is emphasized the primacy of the meaning of “true being” in determining the other senses of truth. The third chapter explores the senses of “transcendence” and “immanence”, examining the redefinition of these concepts promoted with the transition to Transcendental Phenomenology and how it reconfigures the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity, revealing the former as constitutive and the latter as constituted. This transformation suggests the loss of the autonomy of the transcendent in relation to subjectivity, a presupposition of correspondence-based truth. In the fourth chapter, a similar approach is taken to that in the second chapter, focusing, however, on Husserl's description of the senses of “truth” and “evidence” in works of the transcendental phase of Phenomenology. The aim of this analysis is to demonstrate that the formal characterization of such concepts remains in accordance with the parameters established in the Logical Investigations, contrary to what the transformations discussed in the third chapter might suggest, and that the primacy of the meaning of “truth” attributed to the object also persists in the transcendental version of Husserlian thought. Considering this, the problem regarding the implications of “transcendence” in Husserl's conception of truth is established in the fifth and final chapter: initially, it is explained how correspondence-based truth becomes problematic in the Logical Investigations precisely due to the meaning of “transcendent” adopted in this work. Finally, a justification is proposed for maintaining correspondence-based truth in Transcendental Phenomenology due to the implications of the specifically phenomenologicaltranscendental concept of transcendence. This interpretative proposal is presented through the demarcation of a double constitutive layer concerning the objective pole of the intentional relation committed to the achievement of true knowledge. Based on the description of the constitutive processes carried out in each of these layers, it is ultimately argued that the autonomy of the transcendent in relation to the veritative relation – a requirement inscribed in the correspondence-based conception of truth – is ensured by the constitution of the transcendent as such, carried out in the foundational layer. Besides, the constitutive dependence of the transcendent as true in relation to subjectivity, imposed by transcendental reduction, is expressed in the synthesis of evident fulfillment carried out in the founded layer.
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    Fundação e instituições no pensamento de Hannah Arendt
    (Universidade Federal do Espírito Santo, 2023-09-25) Santos, Edson Kretle dos; Nascimento, Daniel Arruda; http://lattes.cnpq.br/0578569833689838; https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1733-1925; http://lattes.cnpq.br/8473460175262791; Oliveira, Jose Luiz de; Muller, Maria Cristina; Silva, Adriano Correia; https://orcid.org/0000000168191681; http://lattes.cnpq.br/7465568204123045; Araujo, Ricardo Corrêa de; http://lattes.cnpq.br/5638777509855807
    This thesis proposes to discuss the foundation of the secular state’s issue in Hannah Arendt's political theory. Starting from her essay: On Revolution, the author's major work on the subject, we sought to place this object of research within the hermeneutic horizon that emphasizes the foundation and its criticisms of contemporary legal and political institutions. It is worth highlighting that the relationship between the foundation and constitutional authenticity has received little attention from Arendt intellectuals than those who explore its agonistic dimension, given that, until then, the creator was recognized as an early thinker and not as an author of order and institutional stability. To do so, the theme will be approached through three concepts: that of authority, relating it to the theme of power and the process of secularization typical of modernity; that of freedom, understood in its political dimension of the foundational action, and that of the Constitution and conservation as a specific form of institutional realization implied in the idea of rupture included in the debates on the nature of revolutionary acts. At the same time, it is intended to show how this subject place the issue of Law at the centre of the author's line of thinking, going against the readings that emphasize the institutional dimension of Arendt's conception. Understanding the meaning of this theoretical démarche has much to gain when it is introduced into the analysis of the proposed theme from a perspective of the rule of law by problematizing the postulates of law and the politics that underlie them, such as submission to the rule of law, the division of powers, the creation of constitutions, the guarantee of individual rights and, mainly, a political statute given only by the public space. In this way, it is observed that a procedural structure enables the contention between institutions and political action, which is why the founding principles are embodied in the Constitution, which will represent both the established and instituting forces in the action and preservation of political freedom. This allows us to conclude that strengthening the active participation of citizens is balanced with the institutions and principles founded and agreed in the Constitution and also shows the limits and possibilities that provide and expand the place of “acting in concert” in the Democratic State of Law.