Doutorado em Filosofia
URI Permanente para esta coleção
Nível: Doutorado
Ano de início: 2019
Conceito atual na CAPES: 4
Ato normativo: Ato normativo: Homologado pelo CNE (Portaria MEC Nº 609, de 14/03/2019).
Publicação no DOU 18 de março de 2019, seç. 1 - Parecer CNE/CES nº 487/2018, Processo no 23001.000335/2018-51).
Periodicidade de seleção: Semestral
Área(s) de concentração: Filosofia
Url do curso: https://filosofia.ufes.br/pt-br/pos-graduacao/PPGFil/detalhes-do-curso?id=125
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- ItemUm animal que se autointerpreta: a articulação entre ontologia, história e política na filosofia de Charles Taylor(Universidade Federal do Espírito Santo, 2024-08-05) Ribeiro Filho, Marcos Aurélio Pensabem; Pereira, Taís Silva; https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9618-5801; Barreira, Marcelo Martins; https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9367-3073; http://lattes.cnpq.br/; https://orcid.org/; http://lattes.cnpq.br/; Oliveira, Juliano Cordeiro da Costa; https://orcid.org/; http://lattes.cnpq.br/; Araújo, Luiz Bernardo Leite; https://orcid.org/; http://lattes.cnpq.br/; Vincenzi, Brunela Vieira de; https://orcid.org/; http://lattes.cnpq.br/; Araújo, Ricardo Corrêa de; http://lattes.cnpq.br/This study intends to explain how ontology, history and politics are linked to the thesis of the human as a self-interpreting animal in Charles Taylor's philosophy. To this end, the theme will be developed in three parts. In the first and second chapters, the study focuses on Taylor's ontological analysis, understood as an investigation of the hermeneutic conditions of the way in which human beings realize themselves in the world. In other words: an analysis of the characteristic elements necessary for all meaningful human action. In the third chapter, the study is dedicated to discussing how the ontological-anthropological thesis defended by Taylor is historical and therefore needs a narrative foundation. Thus, we try to reconstruct the conception of history underlying the historical narrative that provides argumentative support for the thesis of the human as a self-interpreting animal. Finally, in the fourth and last chapter, the research consists of explaining how Taylor's conception of the political-secular is in line with and interconnected to both his narrative reconstruction of Modernity and his anthropological-hermeneutic thesis. Through this argumentative approach, we try to explain the intertwined way in which ontology, history and politics are articulated in Taylor's thesis of the human as a self-interpreting animal.
- ItemDo sentido ao problema da verdade na fenomenologia de Edmund Husserl: implicações da ressignificação transcendental do conceito de transcendência na adaequatio rei et intellectus husserliana(Universidade Federal do Espírito Santo, 2024-06-12) Rocha, João Marcelo Silva da; Santos, Jorge Augusto da Silva; https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6111-1693; http://lattes.cnpq.br/; Orientador2; https://orcid.org/; http://lattes.cnpq.br/; https://orcid.org/; http://lattes.cnpq.br/; Wu, Roberto; https://orcid.org/; http://lattes.cnpq.br/; Sena, Sandro Márcio Moura de; https://orcid.org/; http://lattes.cnpq.br/; Curvello, Flávio Vieira; https://orcid.org/; http://lattes.cnpq.br/; Tourinho, Carlos Diógenes; http://lattes.cnpq.br/The present thesis develops reflections on the concepts of truth and transcendence as they manifest especially in the Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, with the general aim of analyzing the implications of the meaning of “transcendence” in the correspondence-based conception of truth prevalent in Husserlian thought. Structured in five chapters, the investigation begins by outlining the traditional sense of truth as correspondence in its structuring aspects and the emerging problematic in the configuration of the relationship between knowing subject and knowable object based on specific delimitations of the concept of transcendence. Thus, Husserl's concepts of “truth” and “evidence” advocated in the Logical Investigations are analyzed, delineating the four phenomenological senses of “truth” as exposed in §39 of the 6th Logical Investigation. Moreover, it is emphasized the primacy of the meaning of “true being” in determining the other senses of truth. The third chapter explores the senses of “transcendence” and “immanence”, examining the redefinition of these concepts promoted with the transition to Transcendental Phenomenology and how it reconfigures the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity, revealing the former as constitutive and the latter as constituted. This transformation suggests the loss of the autonomy of the transcendent in relation to subjectivity, a presupposition of correspondence-based truth. In the fourth chapter, a similar approach is taken to that in the second chapter, focusing, however, on Husserl's description of the senses of “truth” and “evidence” in works of the transcendental phase of Phenomenology. The aim of this analysis is to demonstrate that the formal characterization of such concepts remains in accordance with the parameters established in the Logical Investigations, contrary to what the transformations discussed in the third chapter might suggest, and that the primacy of the meaning of “truth” attributed to the object also persists in the transcendental version of Husserlian thought. Considering this, the problem regarding the implications of “transcendence” in Husserl's conception of truth is established in the fifth and final chapter: initially, it is explained how correspondence-based truth becomes problematic in the Logical Investigations precisely due to the meaning of “transcendent” adopted in this work. Finally, a justification is proposed for maintaining correspondence-based truth in Transcendental Phenomenology due to the implications of the specifically phenomenologicaltranscendental concept of transcendence. This interpretative proposal is presented through the demarcation of a double constitutive layer concerning the objective pole of the intentional relation committed to the achievement of true knowledge. Based on the description of the constitutive processes carried out in each of these layers, it is ultimately argued that the autonomy of the transcendent in relation to the veritative relation – a requirement inscribed in the correspondence-based conception of truth – is ensured by the constitution of the transcendent as such, carried out in the foundational layer. Besides, the constitutive dependence of the transcendent as true in relation to subjectivity, imposed by transcendental reduction, is expressed in the synthesis of evident fulfillment carried out in the founded layer.
- ItemDo sentido ao problema da verdade na fenomenologia de Edmund Husserl : implicações da ressignificação transcendental do conceito de transcendência na adaequatio rei et intellectus husserliana(Universidade Federal do Espírito Santo, 2024-06-12) Rocha, João Marcelo Silva da; Santos, Jorge Augusto da Silva ; https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6111-1693; http://lattes.cnpq.br/3088783002373165; https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4590-3081; http://lattes.cnpq.br/3191983998922351; Wu, Roberto; https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6344-4571; http://lattes.cnpq.br/3569614178649757; Sena, Sandro Márcio Moura de ; https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2119-7741; http://lattes.cnpq.br/4020907438721922; Curvello, Flávio Vieira ; https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9072-4472; http://lattes.cnpq.br/3683549895365835; Tourinho, Carlos Diogenes Cortes ; https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5963-599X; http://lattes.cnpq.br/4439167668298111The present thesis develops reflections on the concepts of truth and transcendence as they manifest especially in the Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, with the general aim of analyzing the implications of the meaning of “transcendence” in the correspondence-based conception of truth prevalent in Husserlian thought. Structured in five chapters, the investigation begins by outlining the traditional sense of truth as correspondence in its structuring aspects and the emerging problematic in the configuration of the relationship between knowing subject and knowable object based on specific delimitations of the concept of transcendence. Thus, Husserl's concepts of “truth” and “evidence” advocated in the Logical Investigations are analyzed, delineating the four phenomenological senses of “truth” as exposed in §39 of the 6th Logical Investigation. Moreover, it is emphasized the primacy of the meaning of “true being” in determining the other senses of truth. The third chapter explores the senses of “transcendence” and “immanence”, examining the redefinition of these concepts promoted with the transition to Transcendental Phenomenology and how it reconfigures the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity, revealing the former as constitutive and the latter as constituted. This transformation suggests the loss of the autonomy of the transcendent in relation to subjectivity, a presupposition of correspondence-based truth. In the fourth chapter, a similar approach is taken to that in the second chapter, focusing, however, on Husserl's description of the senses of “truth” and “evidence” in works of the transcendental phase of Phenomenology. The aim of this analysis is to demonstrate that the formal characterization of such concepts remains in accordance with the parameters established in the Logical Investigations, contrary to what the transformations discussed in the third chapter might suggest, and that the primacy of the meaning of “truth” attributed to the object also persists in the transcendental version of Husserlian thought. Considering this, the problem regarding the implications of “transcendence” in Husserl's conception of truth is established in the fifth and final chapter: initially, it is explained how correspondence-based truth becomes problematic in the Logical Investigations precisely due to the meaning of “transcendent” adopted in this work. Finally, a justification is proposed for maintaining correspondence-based truth in Transcendental Phenomenology due to the implications of the specifically phenomenological transcendental concept of transcendence. This interpretative proposal is presented through the demarcation of a double constitutive layer concerning the objective pole of the intentional relation committed to the achievement of true knowledge. Based on the description of the constitutive processes carried out in each of these layers, it is ultimately argued that the autonomy of the transcendent in relation to the veritative relation – a requirement inscribed in the correspondence-based conception of truth – is ensured by the constitution of the transcendent as such, carried out in the foundational layer. Besides, the constitutive dependence of the transcendent as true in relation to subjectivity, imposed by transcendental reduction, is expressed in the synthesis of evident fulfillment carried out in the founded layer
- ItemO conflito entre determinismo e liberdade a partir do problema da consciência no pensamento de Nietzsche : do naturalismo ao expressivismo(Universidade Federal do Espírito Santo, 2024-04-30) Onofri, Wilson Luciano; Co-orientador1; https://orcid.org/; http://lattes.cnpq.br/; Co-orientador2; https://orcid.org/; http://lattes.cnpq.br/; Co-orientador3; https://orcid.org/; http://lattes.cnpq.br/; Co-orientador4; ID do co-orientador4; Lattes do co-orientador4; Viesenteiner, Jorge Luiz ; https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3727-7890 ; http://lattes.cnpq.br/7444634503835464 ; Orientador2; https://orcid.org/; http://lattes.cnpq.br/; https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2948-848X; http://lattes.cnpq.br/8870902767738066; Araldi, Clademir Luís ; https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8255-2946 ; http://lattes.cnpq.br/9512892707756969 ; Mattioli, William ; https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2894-548X ; http://lattes.cnpq.br/1581514107642478 ; Paschoal, Antônio Edmilson ; https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0843-4204 ; http://lattes.cnpq.br/0158461643798918 ; Paula, Wander Andrade de ; http://lattes.cnpq.br/9915527652524532 ; 5º membro da banca; https://orcid.org/; http://lattes.cnpq.br/; 6º membro da banca; https://orcid.org/; http://lattes.cnpq.br/; 7º membro da banca; https://orcid.org/; http://lattes.cnpq.br/The thesis defended here is the possibility of making freedom and determinism compatible in the problem of consciousness based on an expressivist conception of moral agent, in Nietzsche’s philosophy. As an expressivist moral agent, it is understood here that the moral agent is not a previously given entity that needs to be discovered to conduct the action and its evaluation, but first and foremost, the location where transformation processes take place, constituted in the space of tension between the individual and the supra-individual plane where the moral agent is constituted in the social dynamics itself. Thus, the expressivist moral agent would not be behind the action as a causal or intentional entity, but would manifest itself in the action as a totality, in the process of carrying out the action itself. To this end, the development of Nietzsche's thought on the subject was reconstructed based on the tension between naturalism and transcendental philosophy, from the first reflections of youth to maturity, identifying a solution to the problem in expressivism. Furthermore, it was necessary to identify the notion of freedom desired by Nietzsche in the idea of self-awareness, and not just linked to the mere idea of consciousness, and thus relate the contemporary problem of philosophy of mind with Nietzsche's program of self-creation
- ItemBens fundamentais e razoabilidade prática: contribuição para uma crítica ao conceito de basic values na obra lei natural e direitos naturais de John Finnis(Universidade Federal do Espírito Santo, 2023-11-22) Simões, Edilezia Freire; Santos, Jorge Augusto da Silva; https://orcid.org/0000000161111693; http://lattes.cnpq.br/3088783002373165; https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7322-4492; http://lattes.cnpq.br/0728481679250726; Pinheiro, Victor Sales; Boeira, Marcus Paulo Rycembel; Barreira, Marcelo Martins; https://orcid.org/0000000293673073; http://lattes.cnpq.br/0690909917220112; Araujo, Ricardo Correa de; http://lattes.cnpq.br/5638777509855807Finnis’s philosophy, as a reinterpretation of the tradition of classical thought (mainly Aristotle’s) and Thomasian thought, is structured in a context influenced by the contemporary interpretation that German Grisez makes of the first principle of practical reason presented by Thomas Aquinas, in the Summa theologiae, Ia-IIae, question 94, article 2. In the work Natural law and natural rights, under this influence, Finnis presents the methodology used in the study of his theory of natural law with a reflection on the fundamental goods, of which we highlight practical reasonableness and play. Using the criteria of practical reasonableness, it is possible to identify whether or not a ‘good’ constitutes a ‘central case’; therefore, fundamental for full human flourishing. According to Finnis' theoretical position, there are demands or requirements that basic values need to meet in order for them to be understood as fundamental. As Finnis devotes little attention to the good 'play', this thesis precisely aims to fill this gap by critically deepening the fundamental good play, either from Finnis himself, or based on approaches with other authors in the philosophical tradition. Throughout the thesis, we discuss the methodological assumptions that underlie Finnis's theory of natural law and examine Finnis's theoretical exposition on fundamental goods. In this aspect, we highlight its characteristics and specificities, as well as the criticisms directed at the Finnis’s interpretation regarding the list of fundamental goods, the premorality of these goods and the absence of hierarchy between them, as well as the 'decisionism' presented as a criterion. Finally, once this journey has been completed, it is concluded with a critical contribution to the fundamental good ‘play’ as it is thematized in the work Natural law and natural rights, by John Finnis.